Abstract This chapter examines the relationship between the values of research and privacy in the context of medical research on patient data. An analytical framework is developed by interpreting the conception of privacy advanced in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights by reference to the Principle of Generic Consistency, seminally argued to be the supreme principle of morality by Alan Gewirth. This framework is used to uncloak the inequity of positions uncompromisingly prioritising research values over privacy values or vice versaresearch worship and consent worship, respectively. We then apply this framework to three hypothetical studies to show how apparent conflicts between research and privacy values can be resolved.
Introduction
Medical research on personal data involves a conflict between moral interests or values. On the one hand, research promises moral benefits that flow from the acquisition of generalisable knowledge related to human health or treatment. On the other hand, research participants have interests in being able to control the flow and use of private information about themselves. However, precisely how these values relate to each other, and how conflicts between them are to be resolved, stands in need of analysis.
To focus our discussion we will examine three hypothetical studies. The first, the infectious disease study, involves the use the data of recipients of blood transfusions for the purpose of investigating the spread of a specific infectious disease by transfusions. The second, the cancer study, uses data from patients diagnosed with cancer for the purpose of investigating cancer. The third, the contraceptive study, involves the use of data from patients diagnosed with severe fertility problems and associated conditions for the purpose of investigating future avenues for research into chemical contraceptives.
The identification and relative weight of the moral factors evoked by these studies will differ from one moral theory to another. We will, therefore, say no more about these hypothetical studies until we will have outlined the features of the moral theory that we intend to apply. In the section on 'The PGC and its Derivation', we will outline our reasons for applying the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC), which Alan Gewirth (1978) has argued-to our minds successfully-to be the supreme principle of morality. In the section on 'Research, Privacy, and Consent' we will outline a framework for viewing the relationship between privacy and medical research values with reference to the jurisprudence of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)-that we contend is broadly in line with the requirements set by the PGC, and its conception of privacy. We will argue that privacy and research values, while capable of conflicting are also capable of supporting each other and that to an important extent research values are privacy values and vice versa. Not to see this distorts the nature of the relationship. Nevertheless, conflicts can exist between these values and, in the section on 'The Hypothetical Studies Considered' we analyse the three hypothetical studies by reference to the PGC, in order to illustrate how the PGC may be used to balance the conflicting values involved therein.
The PGC and Its Derivation
The PGC grants all agents 1 rights to the generic conditions of agency, so-called generic rights. The generic conditions of agency consist of what agents need, irrespective of what their purposes might be, in order to be able to act at all or in order to be able to act with general chances of success. The former category comprises 'basic' generic needs, termed 'basic goods' by Gewirth. The latter category is divided into nonsubtractive and additive generic needs. Whereas lack of, or interference with, a basic generic need precludes action altogether (or at least diminishes an agent's chances of being able to act at all), lack of a non-subtractive generic need adversely affects the agent's ability to maintain his or her capacity to act, and interference with an additive generic good affects the agent's capacity to increase its capacity to act-in all three cases, regardless of the purposes involved.
The generic conditions of agency (and consequently the generic rights) are hierarchically ordered according to a criterion of needfulness for agency (see Gewirth 1978, ch. 2; 1996, 45-46) . According to this criterion, basic rights override nonsubtractive rights, which, in turn, trump additive rights in cases of conflict. 
